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2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-308b (1975), which gives the Court authority to review probate
proceedings under the Utah Uniform Probate Code.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
IS APPELLANT HAROLD HUPE AS THE PERSON WITH STATUTORY
PRIORITY FOR APPOINTMENT AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES FOR LITIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN
GOOD FAITH TO PROBATE AN APPARENTLY INTESTATE ESTATE AND
DEFEND IT AGAINST AN ALLEGED LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL THAT
THE TRIAL COURT LATER ADMITTED TO PROBATE?
The sole issue in this case is whether the Appellant Harold F. Hupe ("Harold Hupe"), the
person with priority for appointment as personal representative and a person nominated as
personal representative under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, is entitled to reimbursement by
the estate of his deceased son Jamie Peter Hupe for attorney fees incurred in bringing the estate
into probate and defending the intestate estate against an alleged testamentary instrument that
was later admitted into probate.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issue concerns the trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719. "The
trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law reviewed for correctness without
deference." Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp.. 836 P.2d 797 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also Ward
v. Richfield Citv. 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990); Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d
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1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). "The standard of review for a simple legal interpretation of a rule or
statute is correctness. . . . When reviewing legal determinations, an appellate court decides the
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law." State
v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). Thus, the trial court's denial of
necessary fees and expenses in this case should be reviewed for correctness.
This issue was raised below in Harold Hupe's Motion for Attorney Fees and Motion to
Reconsider Denial of Attorney Fees. See Addendum at A1-A3 and A39-A46.

APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code (UUPC), Utah Code Ann.
§§ 75-1-101 to -8-101, are dispositive of this appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102. Purposes - Rule of construction.
(1) This code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies.
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are:
(a) To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents,
missing persons, protected persons, minors, and incapacitated persons;
(b) To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution
of his property;
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient system for administering the estate
of the decedent and making distributions to his successors;
(d) To facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts; and
(e) to make uniform the law among various jurisdictions.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-203. Priority among persons seeking appointment as
personal representative.
(1) Whether the proceedings are formal or informal, persons who are not
disqualified have priority for appointment in the following order:
(a) the person with priority as determined by a probated will, including a
person nominated by a power conferred in a will;
2
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(b) the surviving spouse of the decedent who is a devisee of the decedent;
(c) other devisees of the decedent;
(d) the surviving spouse of the decedent;
(e) other heirs of the decedent;
(f) forty-five days after the death of the decedent, any creditor.
(2) An objection to an appointment can be made only in formal proceedings. In
case of objection the priorities stated in Subsection (1) apply except that:
(a) If the estate appears to be more than adequate to meet exemptions and
costs of administration but inadequate to discharge anticipated
unsecured claims, the court, on petition of creditors, may appoint any
qualified person;
(b) In case of objection to appointment of a person other than one whose
priority is determined by will by an heir or devisee appearing to have a
substantial interest in the estate, the court may appoint a person who is
acceptable to heirs and devisees whose interests in the estate appear to
be worth in total more than one-half of the probable distributable
value, or, in default of this accord, any suitable person.
(3) A person entitled to letters under Subsections 1(b) through 1(f) and a person
aged 18 and over who would be entitled to letters but for his age, may
nominate a qualified person to act as personal representative. Any person
aged 18 and over may renounce his right to nominate or to an appointment by
appropriate writing filed with the court. When two or more persons share a
priority, those of them who do not renounce must concur in nominating
another to act for them or in applying for appointment in informal
proceedings. Before appointing fewer than all persons who share a priority
and who have not renounced or nominated another, the court must determine
that those sharing the priority, although given notice of the formal
proceedings, have failed to request the appointment or to nominate another for
appointment, and that administration is necessary.
(4) Conservators of the estates of protected persons, or if there is not conservator,
any guardian, except a guardian ad litem of a minor or incapacitated person,
may exercise the same right to nominate, to object to another's appointment,
or to participate in determining the preference of a majority in interest of the
heirs and devisees that the protected person or ward would have if qualified
for appointment.
(5) Appointment of one who does not have priority under Subsection (1) or
priority resulting from renunciation or nomination determined pursuant to this
section may be made only in formal proceedings. Before appointing one
without priority, the court must determine that those having priority, although
given notice of the proceedings, have failed to request appointment or to
nominate another for appointment, and that administration is necessary.
(6) No person is qualified to serve as a personal representative who is:
(a) under the age of 21;
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(b) a person whom the court finds unsuitable in formal proceedings.
(7) A personal representative appointed by a court of the decedent's domicile has
priority over all other persons except where the decedent's will nominates
different persons to be personal representative in this state and in the state of
domicile. The domiciliary personal representative may nominate another,
who shall have the same priority as the domiciliary personal representative.
(8) This section governs priority for appointment of a successor personal
representative but does not apply to the selection of a special administrator.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719. Expenses in estate litigation.
If any personal representative or person nominated as personal representative
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he
is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements,
including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This appeal involves Harold Hupe's entitlement to attorneys fees for litigating in probate

his son's apparently intestate estate and defending the estate against a claim of an alleged lost
holographic will. Although the trial court ultimately accepted the lost holographic will and
admitted it to probate, Harold Hupe is entitled to his attorneys fees because he was the nominated
personal representative and litigated the issue in good faith.
II.

Course of Proceedings/Disposition Below
Harold Hupe filed a motion and supporting memorandum in the trial court requesting

attorneys fees. See Addendum at A1-A13. After briefing, the trial court denied the motion. Id.
at A33-A36. Harold Hupe then filed a motion to reconsider. Id. at A39-A46. After briefing, the
trial court summarily denied that motion. Id. at A55.

4
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The decedent, Jamie Peter Hupe, died with no issue and with no spouse. He was

survived by his father Harold Hupe and by three brothers, including Appellee Jeffrey Paul Hupe
("Jeff Hupe"). As the father of decedent, Harold Hupe was his sole heir at law. See Addendum
atAl,A4,A5.
2.

Six months after decedent's death, Harold Hupe filed a petition for informal

probate on the understanding that his son had died intestate. Id. at Al, A4, A41. Jeff Hupe knew
of the decedent's death as he had been the decedent's main caretaker during his final illness.
However, Jeff Hupe did not announce the existence of a will or initiate probate in the first six
months after the decedent's death. Id. at A4, A5, A26, A41. Thus, when Harold Hupe filed his
petition for probate Jeff Hupe was not even an interested person with standing to participate in
decedent's probate in intestacy under Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(24) (1998 Supp.) or to
nominate a personal representative under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-203 (1975). Harold Hupe was
therefore the only person with standing to initiate probate and nominate himself or a third party
as the decedent's personal representative under the intestacy laws of the Utah Uniform Probate
Code.
3.

After Harold Hupe filed for informal probate, nominating himself as the

decedent's personal representative, Jeff Hupe contested the probate petition. Id at A5, A26. Jeff
Hupe alleged that the decedent had made a holographic will naming Jeff Hupe as his sole heir
and personal representative. Id. Jeff Hupe never produced this will, and he could not identify
the two witnesses who had attested to the alleged will. Id. Furthermore, Jeff Hupe himself
5
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maintained that the alleged holographic will was last seen in the decedent's possession. Id. This
fact created a statutory presumption that the decedent had repudiated the will by destroying it.
See Estate of Wheadon, 579 P.2d 930, 931 (Utah 1978) ("A well-established presumption of law
exists as follows: when it is shown that the testator made a will of which he had possession, or
access to, but that it could not be found at his death, the law presumes the testator destroyed it
himself, with the intent of revoking it.")
4.

After trial on the challenge to Harold Hupe's petition, the district court ultimately

found that the holographic will had been lost rather than destroyed by the decedent, and it
admitted the lost will to probate based on the testimony of Jeff Hupe and other witnesses to the
lost will's contents. Id. at A5. As a result of thesefindings,the trial court denied Harold Hupe's
petition for appointment as personal representative and appointed appellee as the decedent's
personal representative under the newly admitted will. Id.
5.

Following this order, Harold Hupe requested an award of attorney fees for his

expenses in initiating and pursuing the probate proceeding. Id. at A1-A3. The trial court denied
Harold Hupe's request. Id. at A33-A36. The trial court denied this motion on the grounds that
Harold Hupe was not entitled to collect attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719 (1971)
because he was not the personal representative nominated in decedent's will. Id. Harold Hupe
then filed a Motion to Reconsider Denial of Attorney Fees. Id. at A39-46. The trial court denied
the motion to reconsider. Id. at A55.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Harold Hupe is entitled to his attorneys fees because he was nominated as a personal
representative of his deceased son's estate and defended the estate in good faith against a claim of
a lost holographic will. The award of attorney fees under these circumstances is an issue of first
impression in Utah. This is likely because Section 75-3-719 of the UUPC is clear on its face.
The provision states:

"If any personal representative or person nominated as personal

representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he
is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, including
reasonable attorney fees incurred." IcL Despite this provision, the trial court concluded that
Harold Hupe was not entitled to attorney fees in this case because, since Jeff Hupe's challenge
was ultimately successful, Harold Hupe was never actually appointed as the decedent's personal
representative.

This conclusion contradicts the plain language of Section 75-3-719 and

undermines the fundamental legislative purpose of the UUPC.
Harold Hupe was a "person nominated as personal representative" as contemplated by
Sections 75-3-203 and 75-3-719 of the UUPC. Harold Hupe incurred his attorney fees and other
expenses by initiating probate proceedings as the decedent's sole heir at law and hence as the
sole statutory nominee. He defended the intestate estate against Jeff Hupe's challenge. Harold
Hupe took both actions in good faith; he initiated probate six months after the decedent's death
on the reasonable assumption that the decedent had died intestate. He then defended decedent's
estate against a challenge based on the alleged prior existence of an holographic will that was last
seen in the decedent's possession and which was never found after his death. This challenge was
ultimately successful because the trial court found that decedent had not destroyed the will and
7
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that there was sufficient evidence of its contents for it to be admitted into probate. However,
Section 75-3-719 states that the nominee personal representatives is entitled to fees and expenses
for "any action, whether successful or not." IdL Thus, the trial court's denial of Harold Hupe's
attorney fees was in error.
Furthermore, the trial court's denial of attorneys fees creates significant problems in light
of the language and legislative intent of Section 75-3-719. First, the denial of Harold Hupe's
attorney fees contradicts this Section's mandate that attorney fees will be awarded for "any
proceeding in good faith, regardless of whether successful or not..." Second, denial of his
attorneys fees contravenes the established principle of probate law that litigants in probate
proceedings are entitled to reimbursement from the estate or other heirs for any expenses
incurred to further probate of the estate as a whole. See e.g.. Estate of Ashton, 898 P.2d 824, 826
(Ut. Ct. App. 1995) (distinguishing between fees incurred to contest for a share of an estate and
fees incurred to probate or otherwise benefit an estate as a whole). Third, denial of attorneys fees
in this case discriminates between testate and intestate estates by stripping the statutorily
prioritized representatives of intestate estates of the protection against personal liability for
probate expenses that has been built into the UUPC. Finally, this decision creates a disincentive
for relatives to serve as personal representatives because of the risk that a subsequent challenge
will leave them personally liable for probate costs. This disincentive threatens the UUPCs
primary purpose, which is to encourage probate proceedings as the preferred means "to discover
and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property." Utah Code Ann. §
75-l-102(b)(1996).

8
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For these reasons, this Court should vacate the trial court's Order denying attorneys fees
and remand this case for a determination of reasonable attorneys fees.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The trial court's denial of attorney fees was based on a misunderstanding of the role of
fees and expenses awarded in probate proceedings. Thus, before addressing the specific issues
involved in Harold Hupe's case, it is necessary to examine briefly the structure and legislative
goals of the UUPC.
The statutory mechanism through which state-supervised distribution of decedents'
property is accomplished is the probate process. The alternative to this process is distribution,
without court supervision, in which the distribution of decedents' property is determined without
supervision by the individuals who happen to have control of the property at the time of death.
Such unofficial and unsupervised distributions are susceptible to serious abuses, and the probate
system was designed to prevent them. Thus, a primary goal of the UUPC and other probate
codes is to encourage survivors and interested parties to distribute decedents' property through
the probate process.
The personal representative plays an indispensable role in the probate process. In order
for a probate to be initiated, an interested person must petition for probate and accept
appointment as personal representative. Thus, provisions for awards of attorneys fees and other
probate expenses to personal representatives play a central role in promoting initiation of probate
proceedings.

A fundamental tenet of the probate system is that a decedent's estate must

reimburse the personal representative for all costs associated with probating and otherwise
9
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administering an estate.

This tenet rests on common law notions of equity, but is also

fundamental to the structure of the UUPC.
For these reasons, an award of attorneys fees to a personal representative under the UUPC
involves very different considerations of equity and public policy from those which govern an
award of attorney fees under most other statutes. Most statutes authorizing attorney fees are
designed to discourage meritless litigation by awarding fees to the prevailing party. In contrast,
award of fees in probate proceedings is designed to encourage probate proceedings by insuring
that, absent bad faith, individual participants will bear the cost of those proceedings only in
proportion to the benefit that they actually receivefromthe estate itself.

ARGUMENT
L

AS THE PERSON WITH STATUTORY PRIORITY FOR APPOINTMENT AS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, HAROLD HUPE IS ENTITLED TO
ATTORNEY FEES FOR LITIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN GOOD FAITH TO
PROBATE THE APPARENTLY INTESTATE ESTATE AND DEFEND IT
AGAINST AN ALLEGED LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL THAT THE TRIAL
COURT LATER ADMITTED TO PROBATE
A, Harold Hupe is Entitled to Attorney Fees Under the Plain Language of Section
75-3-719 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. Which Establishes That Personal
Representatives or Nominee Personal Representatives are Entitled to
Reimbursement of the Costs of Any Proceeding Undertaken in Good Faith,
Whether Successful or Not
Harold Hupe is entitled to attorneys fees under the plain language of Section 75-3-719 of

the UUPC because he incurred these fees in good faith as the statutorily nominated personal
representative of decedent's intestate estate.

Section 75-3-719 states:

"If any personal

representative or person nominated as a personal representative defends or prosecutes any

10
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proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his
necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney fees incurred." Id

1.

Harold Hupe Was a Person Nominated As Personal Representative Under the
UUPC

Harold Hupe was clearly a "person nominated as personal representative" as
contemplated in Sections 75-3-203 and 75-3-719 of the UUPC. As the decedent's only heir in
intestacy, Harold Hupe was the sole person with priority for appointment as personal
representative under Section 75-3-203(1) of the UUPC. Persons with priority for appointment
under the intestacy provisions may "nominate a qualified person to act as personal
representative." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-203(3). Persons may nominate themselves, and the
process through which such nomination occurs is the filing of a petition for probate and
appointment of personal representative. Thus, when Harold Hupe, the only person with priority
for appointment under the statute in the case of intestacy, filed a petition for appointment as
personal representative nominating himself, he clearly became a person "nominated as personal
representative" under Section 75-3-719. Consequently, Harold Hupe was "entitled to receive
from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorneys' fees
incurred." Id.
The trial court appears to have assumed that Harold Hupe was not a person nominated as
personal representative because he was not the personal representative allegedly appointed in
decedent's lost holographic will. However, this assumption conflicts with the use of the term
"nominated" in Section 75-3-203.

11
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2.

Harold Hupe Participated in the Probate Proceeding Below in Good Faith

Harold Hupe also participated in the proceedings below in good faith. He did not file his
petition for informal probate and appointment of personal representative until six months after
decedent's death, at which time it was more than reasonable to assume that any heirs under any
will of decedent would have come forward with their claims.

Furthermore, Jeff Hupe's

challenge, while ultimately endorsed by the trial court, was certainly subject to a good faith
challenge and serious scrutiny by the trial court. Jeff Hupe's claim was based on a lost
holographic will to which Jeff Hupe could produce no witnesses. Also, the claim had to
overcome both the presumption against admitting a holographic will based solely on witness
testimony and the presumption that a lost will last seen in a decedent's possession was destroyed
by the decedent himself and has therefore been repudiated. Thus, Harold Hupe is entitled to his
expenses and attorney fees under the plain language of Section 75-3-719.

3. Harold Hupe Incurred These Fees in His Capacity as Personal Representative and Not
in His Capacity as a Claimant of the Estate
Harold Hupe is entitled to his attorney fees and other expenses because he incurred them
in his capacity as the decedent's personal representative and not in his capacity as a claimant of
the estate.

Under Section 75-1-201(24) of the UUPC, standing to participate in probate

proceedings is limited to persons "with a financial interest founded on or defeated by" the
proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(24). Thus, every personal representative necessarily
wears two hats by statutory requirement: one hat as a potential heir whose claims may conflict

12
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with those of other heirs, and a second hat as a fiduciary of the estate with the responsibility to
probate and fairly administer the estate in accordance with the decedent's testamentary
instructions.
It is well-established that probate participants, regardless of their personal interest in the
proceeds of an estate, are entitled to all fees and expenses incurred in their capacity as personal
representative.

See, e.g.. Estate of Ashton. 898 P.2d 824, 826 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

(distinguishing between a personal representatives role "as personal representative" and her role
"as a claimant with interests that conflict with other heirs of the estate"). No Utah case has
defined the line of demarcation between a participant's actions as personal representative and a
participant's actions as a potential heir of the estate. However, cases in other jurisdictions have
distinguished between actions taken to establish, defend or distribute a decedent's estate and
actions taken to resolve disputes between heirs about the relative amounts of their inheritances
under testamentary instruments. See, e.g.. Estate of Foster, 699 P.2d 638, 644 (N.M. Ct. App.
1985 (distinguishing disputes over validity of a will and cases where "the issue was how the will
disposed of the property").
Harold Hupe's actions in this case were clearly the actions of a personal representative.
He initiated probate of the estate, nominated himself as personal representative, and defended the
estate against a challenge based on an alleged will that was presumed to be repudiated by the
decedent under Utah case law. These actions were either necessary administrative prerequisites
to probating the estate or appropriate fiduciary measures of a personal representative whose
responsibility was to ensure that the decedent's testamentary wishes were made effective. Thus,

13
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Harold Hupe is entitled to reimbursement from the estate for the fees and other expenses arising
from these actions.

4.

Harold Hupe Is Entitled to Attorneys Fees Regardless of Whether He Was
Successful

Finally, the trial court appears to have assumed that since Harold Hupe's petition for
probate and appointment of personal representative was not granted, Harold Hupe is not entitled
to fees. However, this conclusion directly contradicts the language of Section 75-3-719, which
mandates award of fees to persons nominated as personal representative who "defends or
prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not." Id. The trial court denied
Harold Hupe's fees for the sole reason that because his action in defense of the intestate estate
was unsuccessful, he was not appointed as decedent's personal representative. This decision
amounts to a holding that nominated personal representatives of intestate estates will not be
awarded expenses and attorney fees unless their actions in probate court are successful. Thus, it
renders meaningless this Section's entitlement to fees for actions undertaken in good faith
"whether successful or not" IdL

B. Denial of Harold Hupe's Attorneys Fees Undermines the Primary Legislative
Purpose of the Utah Uniform Probate Code by Depriving Representatives of
Intestate Estates of the Protections Afforded by the Code And Thereby Creating
a Disincentive for Parties to Bring Intestate Estates Forward for Probate
Denial of Harold Hupe's attorneys fees also undermines the legislative goals and
structure of the UUPC. As noted above, a primary purpose of the UUPC is "to discover and
make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property" by bringing estates into
14
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probate instead of allowing individuals to conduct unsupervised distributions. Utah Code Ann. §
75-l-102(b)(1996).
The UUPC encourages interested parties to initiate probate proceedings by offering a
number of statutory protections in exchange for the parties' participation. These protections
include the assurance that attorneys fees and other expenses created by a decedent's estate will be
born by the estate itself rather than by parties who expend their own money in order to initiate
and move forward probate proceedings.
This legislative goal creates a functional difference between awards of necessary fees and
expenses in probate proceedings and awards of attorneys fees in other types of civil proceedings.
Whereas awards of fees in other civil proceedings are part of the courts' arsenal of discretionary
sanctions, awards of necessary fees and expenses in probate proceedings are designed to
encourage initiation of probate proceedings by guaranteeing that the costs of probating an estate
will be born by the estate itself and not by the individuals who spend their own money to initiate
or pursue probate of the estate.
The unusual function of fee awards in probate proceedings is reflected in the language of
Section 75-3-719. Unlike other attorney fees provisions, Section 75-3-719 does not grant the
trial court discretion to determine whether to award attorney fees. Rather, it states that personal
representatives and persons nominated as personal representatives who engage in good faith
actions are "entitled to receive from the estate . . . necessary expenses and disbursements,
including reasonable attorney fees incurred." Id. This language reflects the two fundamental
tenets of fees awards in the context of probate proceedings. First, that the estate itself should
bear all the costs of probate, including extraordinary probate costs that are necessitated by a
15
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decedent's failure to leave clear testamentary instructions. Second, that the costs of probate
should ultimately be born on a pro rata basis by the individual heirs who actually receive the
property at issue in the probate proceeding.

C. Denial of Harold Hupe's Attorney Fees Offends Basic Principles of Equity
Because His Actions Conferred Benefit on the Estate as a Whole and the Estate
Should Be Required to Reimburse Him for This Benefit and Because Equity
Demands That the Decedent's Estate Bear the Burden of the Decedent's Own
Failure to Leave a Clear Record of His Testamentary Purpose
Basic principles of equity also support Harold Hupe's right to reimbursement for attorney
fees incurred to probate this estate. "Unless displaced by particular provisions of [the UUPC],
the principles of law and equity supplement its provisions." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-1-3 (1975).
These principles, as well as the case law specific to probate proceedings, support Harold Hupe's
claim for reimbursement from the estate for his necessary expenses.
The probate process imposes specific, unavoidable expenses on participants.

These

expenses include the costs and attorneys fees required for filing a petition for probate, providing
public notice of probate proceedings, and preparing for and attending probate hearings. When
these expenditures confer a benefit on the estate as a whole, it is well-established that the estate,
and not the personal representative, should bear the burden of paying for them. See Estate of
Ashton. 898 P.2d 824, 826 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (distinguishing between fees incurred as
personal representative and fees incurred "as a claimant with interests that conflict with other
heirs to the estate"); In re Yonk's Estate, 195 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah 1948) (stating that even a
stranger to the estate appointed over the protest of heirs is entitled to reimbursement for "the
reasonable value of services performed").
16
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Harold Hupe was not a stranger to the estate. Rather, he was the decedent's sole heir at
law at the time he filed his petition and was therefore the only person with standing to petition
for probate or nominate a personal representative. Harold Hupe's actions conferred significant
benefits on the estate by initiating probate and by defending the estate against an allegedly lost
testamentary instrument that faced a legal presumption of invalidity under current Utah case law.
See Estate of Foster. 699 P.2d 638, 646 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) ("'The services of counsel in
preventing distribution under invalid instruments must be held to confer a benefit upon the
estate."') (quoting In Re Estate of Katschor. 637 P.2d 855 (Okla. 1981)). Equitable principles
demand that the estate should repay Harold Hupe, who has received nothing from the estate, for
these benefits, and that he should not bear any part of the costs of probate.

CONCLUSION
Harold Hupe was a person nominated as personal representative under the intestacy
provisions of the UUPC. He incurred attorney fees and expenses in the proceedings below in
good faith. He incurred these fees in his capacity as the nominated personal representative rather
than in his capacity as a claimant under the Utah intestacy provisions. Harold Hupe conferred a
substantial benefit on the estate by initiating probate and by defending the estate against a claim
that, though ultimately successful, warranted serious scrutiny. The language and legislative
goals of the UUPC dictate that the decedent's estate, rather than Harold Hupe, should bear the
cost of these proceedings. Furthermore, basic principles of equity demand that the estate should
reimburse Harold Hupe for the benefit he conferred on it.

17
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For all the reasons stated above, the district court's Order should be reversed and this
Court should remand to the district court with directions to award a reasonable attorneys fee.
DATED this _/£_ day of March, 1999.
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

PATRICfiL D.WHITE
ELIZABETH CONLEY
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE
APPELLANT was served on Cross-Petitioner and Appellee by mailing two true copies thereof to
his attorney of record, by First Class Mail, postage prepaid, this /&** day of March, 1999, in an
envelope addressed as follows:
Leslie Van Franck
Cohne Rappaport & Segal
525 East 100 South #500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

drvL^
Elizabeth Conley
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ELIZABETH S. CONLEY (4815)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*******

In the Matter of the Estate of

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Case No. 973300019 ES

JAMIE HUPE
Deceased.

*******

Harold Hupe ("Mr. Hupe") by and through his attorneys moves for an award of
attorneys feesfromthe estate of Jamie Hupe.
Mr. Hupe, as apparent sole intestate heir filed for the probate of Jamie Hupe's
estate and defended the estate in trial against proponents of a lost holographic will.
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Attorneys Fees Mr. Hupe as nominee personal representative acting in good faith should be
awarded attorneys fees in determining the disposition of the decedent's estate.
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DATED this SS^day of June, 1998.

LIZAB'ETH S. CONLEY^
ELIZABI
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _2^<Aday of June, 1998, I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES to the
following:
Leslie Van Frank, Esq.
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East 100 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah

£LlfrU&> Qto&<J
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ELIZABETH S. CONLEY (4815)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THOU) JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*******

In the Matter of the Estate of

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

JAMIE HUPE
Case No. 973300019 ES
Deceased.

*******

Harold Hupe, by and through his counsel, submits the following MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES.
INTRODUCTION
Harold Hupe ("Mr. Hupe") seeks relieffromthis Court for expenses he incurred on behalf
of the estate of Jamie Hupe. Jamie Hupe, a angle man with no children, died on October 11,
1996. His estate consisted primarily of an annuity which listed his estate as the beneficiary. No
will was presented for probate and Mr. Hupe filed petition for informal probate with an
application for Informal Personal Representative.
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As Jamie's father, Mr. Hupe is Jamie's sole intestate heir and under Utah law is the
nominee personal representative of Jamie's estate.

Therefore, unless and until an alternate

personal representative was assigned Mr. Hupe had a fiduciary duty to administer Jamie Hupe's
estate. After Mr. Hupe filed his petition, Jeff Hupe, one of Jamie Hupe's three brothers, filed an
Objection to the Petition and petitioned to admit a lost will into probate. Jeff Hupe submitted
affidavits from two of his friends stating that they had seen the lost will and that the material
provisions were in decedent's handwriting and was signed by the decedent. The lost will was
reported to be a form will witnessed by two persons and affixed with a notary seal. No witness to
the lost will was named or came forward. Neither of the witnesses who said they saw the lost will
recalled the names of the witnesses to the lost will or the notary, the date of the lost will or the
place it was made.
The matter was brought to the probate court to determine whether the proponents of the
lost will presented sufficient evidence that such a will had existed; that it fulfilled the requirements
of a valid will; what its dispositive provisions said; and that there was sufficient evidence to
overcome the presumption that the will had been revoked. Mr. Hupe defended the Objection and
after he submitted a motion for summary judgment based on the lack of witnesses to the will, Jeff
Hupe presented a cross motion for summary judgment on the basis that the lost will was a
holographic will. Mr. Hupe withdrew his motion and the court denied Jeff Hupe's cross motion
and the matter went to trial. After trial, the court admitted the lost will to probate and did not
appoint Mr. Hupe as personal representative. Nevertheless, Mr. Hupe is entitled to compensation
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for the reasonable expenses he incurred while administering the estate because he served the
estate in good faith in fulfilling his fiduciary duty as the nominee personal representative.
ARGUMENT
L

UNDER UTAH LAW, MR. HUPE IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE
ESTATE OF JAMIE HUPE BECAUSE HE INCURRED HIS EXPENSES IN GOOD FAITH
WHILE PERFORMING HIS FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS THE NOMINEE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE.

Utah law entitles Mr. Hupe to recover the expenses he incurred in good faith while serving
Jamie Hupe's estate as nominated personal representative. The Utah Probate Code states, "If any
personal representative or person nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes any
proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his
necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred." Utah Code
Ann. § 75-3-719 (1997). Mr. Hupe is entitled to compensation for his expenses under Utah law
because he is a person nominated as personal representative and he performed his services in good
faith.
Utah law prefers the intestate heir when appointing a personal representative to the estate.
Mr. Hupe acted as a nominee personal representative in serving the estate of Jamie Hupe. The
Utah Probate Code states (in pertinent part) as follows:
75-3-203. Priority among persons seeking appointment as personal
representative.
(1)
Whether the proceedings are formal or informal, persons
who are not disqualified have priority for appointment in the
following order:
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(a)

the person with priority as determined by a probated
will, including a person nominated by a power
conferred in a will;

(b)

the surviving spouse of the decedent who is a
devisee of the decedent;

(c)

other devisees of the decedent;

(d)

the surviving spouse of the decedent;

(e)

other heirs of the decedent;

(f)

forty-five days after the death of the decedent, any
creditor.

Utah Code Ann. §75-3-201 (1997)(emphasis added). After Jamie Hupe's death, no will was
presented for probate, no devisees named, and Jamie did not leave a spouse. Therefore, under
sentence (e), "other heirs of the decedent," or intestate heirs, are given preference for
appointment as personal representative. Mr. Hupe is sole intestate heir of Jamie Hupe's estate.
Furthermore,finalappointment as personal representative is not required to be considered
a nominee personal representative. The court in In re Estate of Reimer, 229 Neb. 406, 427
N.WJZd 293 (1988) allowed a person nominated in a will and given priority under state law to
collect attorney fees incurred while seeking probate and defending a contested will, even though
the nominee later renounced his priority and was not appointed as personal representative..
The Utah Probate Code reflects the need to reimburse persons who care for the estate
prior to appointment of a official personal representative. The Code states that "powers of a
personal representative relate back in time to give acts by the person appointed which are
benefidal to the estate occurring prior to appointment the same effect as those occurring
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thereafter."

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-701 (1997). Referring to the language of the Uniform

Probate Code §3-720, as codified in Maryland law, the Maryland courts wrote that the legislature
must have intended "that a defense of a will by either a personal representative (who presumably
has qualified) or by a person nominated as a personal representative (who presumably has not
qualified) should similarly be at the expense of the estate." Webster v. Webster, 268 Md. 153,
170, 299 A.2d 814, 823 (1973).

The law encourages responsible estate management by

compensating persons who serve the estate in the interim period prior to official appointment of a
personal representative.
In this case, after Jamie Hupe died, Mr. Hupe was the sole intestate heir to the estate.
Under the Utah Probate Code, Mr. Hupe was preferred for appointment as personal
representative and was therefore a nominee personal representative.

Mr. Hupe fulfilled his

fiduciary duties by seeking administration of the estate. Because the estate consisted of an
annuity, a court order determining who inherited the estate was necessary prior to the payment
out of funds. Although Mr. Hupe was never officially appointed as personal representative, he is
a 'person nominated as personal representative' under Utah Probate Code Section 75-3-719 and
is therefore entitled to compensation for the services he rendered on behalf of the estate.
Second, by acting in good faith, Mr. Hupe is entitled to reimbursement for expenses he
incurred on behalf of Jamie Hupe's estate. A nominee personal representative has an implied duty
to administer the estate. Courts have held that, "[e]ven if the will is diallenged before it is
admitted to probate and a personal representative appointed, the personal representative named in
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the will has the duty to defend in a will contest." In re Killen, 188 Ariz. 569, 574, 937 P.2d 1375,
1380 (1996). See also. Re Swanson's Estate. 240 Iowa 1011, 1016, 38 N.W.2d 652, 655 (1949)
(finding a nominee executor had a duty to propound a will for probate and to resist threatened
contests, and attorney fees reasonably incurred would be allowable against the estate) and, Re
Vaughn's Estate. 149 Wash. 291, 293, 270 P. 1030, 1031 (1928)(awarding attorney fees to
nominated executor who sought probate of an estate and defended the estate in will contest).
Administering and defending an estate in a will contest are of benefit to the estate and
good faith services. In allowing attorney fees, the court in Salmon v. Salmon. 9 Tex. Sup. J. 34,
395 S.W.2d 29, 31 (1965), stated, "a person named as executor in a will is deemed to be acting
for the benefit of the estate when he, in good faith and with probable cause, employs attorneys to
defend the will or prosecute an action to probate the same." The court also found the "right to
allowance of a reasonable attorney's fees out of the assets of the estate is not affected by his
interest in the outcome of the litigation or by the fact that he acted contrary to the wishes of other
beneficiaries:" Id. at 33. Furthermore, courts have found the "estate as an entity is benefited
when gamine controversies as to validity or construction of will are litigated and finally
determined." Matter of Estate of Flaherty. 484 N.W.2d 515 (N.D. 1992) see also. Matter of
Estate of Peterson. 561 N.W.2d 618 (N.D. 1997) (finding "benefit to estate" includes personal
representative's good faith attempts to effectuate testamentary intent) and, Matter of Estate of
Stenson. 243 Mont. 17, 792 P.2d 1119 (1990)(upholding trial courts award of attorney fees
incurred when attorneys' services resulted in determination of rightful heir and benefit to estate).
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By seeking to administer an estate and in defending an estate in a will contest to determine the
testator's intent, a nominee personal representative acts in good faith in benefiting the estate.
A representative can only be reimbursed for services performed on behalf of the estate.
In Ashton v. Ashton. 898 P.2d 824, 826 (Utah App. 1997), the court did not award costs incurred
by an administrator "in her role as a claimant with interests that conflict with other heirs to the
estate, not as personal representative for the estate/' In Ashton, the administrator and beneficiary
incurred costs when she appealed a trial courts finding of the testators' intent, forcing Mrs.
Ashton to divide the estate between herself and her husband's children from a former marriage.
2d. at 824. Mrs. Ashton was not entitled to compensationfromthe estate because her appeal was
solely for personal benefit.
However, a nominee personal representative is entitled to compensation for services
rendered the estate, even though they may also be a benefidaiy of the estate. In Estate of Killea
188 Ariz. 569, 576, 937 P.2d 1375, 1381 (1996), the court found the Uniform Probate Code
"does not exclude arightto reimbursementfromthe estate if the personal representative is also a
benefidaiy of the will," arguing a "personal representative who is also a devisee of the will should
not have to fulfill his duty to defend the validity of the will under the risk that he will have to
personally bear the expense of the defense merely because he is also a benefidaiy." Therefore,
although courts do not reimburse for personal actions, a representative is entitled to
reimbursement for serving the estate even though he would benefitfroma successftd defense.
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As a nominee personal representative, Mr. Hupe had a duty to administer and defend the
estate of Jamie Hupe. Mr. Hupe expedited the administration of the estate by filing for informal
probate and appointment of a personal representative. Since no will was presented following
Jamie Hupe's death, the law presumes all wills were revoked by the testator. Litigation costs
were incurred in defending the estate while proponents of the lost holographic will sought to rebut
this presumption. This litigation was necessary to determine the disposition of the estate. It was
necessary for Mr. Hupe as nominee personal representative, to defend the estate at trial ultimately
and benefiting the estate. At all times he was acting in good faith. Therefore, the estate should
bear the costs. Although the lost holographic will was ultimately admitted and Mr. Hupe was not
officially appointed as personal representative, Mr. Hupe acted in good faith throughout the
proceedings and the administration of the estate to this point is the direct result of Mr. Hupe's
services.

Mr. Hupe should be reimbursed the reasonable expenses he incurred in seeking

administration of Jamie Hupe's estate.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hupe is entitled to recoverfromthe estate reasonable costs he incurred while
serving the estate in good faith. In the absence of a will, Utah law gives the intestate heir
preference in seeking appointment as personal representative. As sole intestate heir, Mr. Hupe is
given this preference and is therefore a nominee personal representative in the law.

Mr. Hupe

sought to administer the estate and defended the estate in a will contest. In these actions, Mr.
Hupe served the estate in good feith by fulfilling his duty as nominee personal representative and
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benefiting the estate by seeking the testator's intent.

Therefore, as nominee personal

representative, Mr. Hupe is entitled to reimbursement of reasonable attorney fees he incurred in
good faith on behalf of the estate.
DATED this 12^-day of June, 1998.

£,L^jjLtJfiL
ETH S. CONLEY
C<
ELIZABETH
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3^day of June, 1998,1 caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES to the following:
Leslie Van Frank, Esq.
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East 100 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City. UT 84147-0008
Telephone: (801)532-2666
Facsimile: (801)355-1813
Attorneys for Petitioner, Jeffrey Paul Hupe

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
HUPE, JAMIE PETER,
(Deceased)

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
HAROLD HUPE'S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES
CaseNo.973300019ES

Jeffrey P. Hupe ("Jeff"), by and through his undersigned counsel, files the following
Memorandum in Opposition to Harold Hupe's H3arokT) Motion for Attorneys Fees.

INTRODUCTION
Harold's argument that he is entitied
qualifies under the statute at issue as a u per^n nominated as personal representative^ The premise
is unsupported by any law, and would lead to the unacceptable consequence that aUwiU contests a^
to be funded solely by the decedent's estate. Harold's argument is soundly contradicted by the case
law to which Harold has cited as well as ^ poU<^ undeipinning &e entire Probate Code, Harold
provided no benefit to Jamie's estate, and he is not entitled to attorneys fees under the statute.
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1.

HAROLD HUPE IS NOT A "PERSON NOMINATED AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE,"

The Utah Probate Code at §75-3-719 allows "any personal representative or person
nominated as personal representative" to defend or prosecute any proceeding in good faith,
successfully or not, and to receive from the estate "his necessary expenses and disbursements,
including reasonable attorneys fees incurred." The key language in the statute is that one who seeks
to recover thereunder must be either appointed by the Court as the personal representative or be
"nominated as personal representative." Harold admits that he was never appointed, but argues that
he acted as a "nominee personalrepresentative"because he allegedly had priority under §75-3-203
to be appointed as personalrepresentative,and he claims he provided services on behalf of the estate.
This fallaciousness of this argument can been seen by examining the invalidity of the various
premises on which it is based:
Harold Provided No Benefit to the Estate. As Harold admits, a personal representative can
only be reimbursed for services performed on behalf of the estate. (Harold's Memorandum, p. 7).
But Harold did not provide services to the estate — instead, in contravention of the expressed
purposes of the Probate Code, Le., to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in
distribution of his property, §75-l-102(2)(b), Harold sought to defeat Jamie's intent and to prevent
Jaime's Will from being probated. Despite having knowledge of the Will even prior to filinghis
petition seeking intestacy, Harold went ahead and asked the court for an order detenniningfliat Jamie
died intestate. In essence, Harold pursued his own self-interest to ensure that Jamie's intent that Jeff
receive the assets contained within the estate would never be effectuated.
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Estate of Ambers, All N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1991) is instructive with regard to Harold's nonentitlement to attorneys fees. In that case, the individual nominated as personal representative in the
will filed a petition for appointment and for formal probate of the will. Several heirs objected to the
petition, and filed a cross-petition for adjudication of intestacy, alleging that the execution of the will
was procured by fraud. The jury ruled in favor of testacy, and the initial petition was granted.
appointing the individual nominated in the will as personal representative of the estate. The personal
representative was then allowed to recover costs and disbursements associated with the will contest
directly from the unsuccessful will contestants. The contestants appealed, asserting that a statute
identical to the one in the case at bar required the personal representative to recover the costs from
the estate. In denying the contestants' appeal, the court ruled:
Contestants' challenge of [the will] did not benefit the estate and was not intended to
benefit the estate. The purpose of the challenge was limited to effecting a change in
who received the estate. Furthermore, to rule as the Contestants urge would diminish
the estate and the Nelsons, as the sole beneficiaries of the will, would have to bear
the entire expense of upholding the will challenged by the Contestants. "It seems to
us that the probate code should [••18] not be construed so as to permit one heir or

devisee tofinancehis or her lawsuit against mother fair or devisee out of the fond?
of the estate.* Estate ofKforvestad 375 N.W.2d 160,171 (N.D. 1985), quoting Estate
ofKesting. 220 Neb. 524. 371 N.W.2d 107. 109 (1985). Nor should a devisee be
forced to bear the expense of upholding a will challenged by an heir or another
devisee in a proceeding that was not intended to benefit the estate.
Estate of Ambers, 477 N.W.2d at 224. Under the same principles by which the personal
representative in Ambers was allowed to collect costs and disbursementsfromthe will contestants,
the will contestants would be preventedfromcollecting their own costs and disbursements that they
had incurredfromthe estate. Harold contested the Will — he did not attempt to uphold the Will. He
is not entitled to fund his challenge to the Will out of the funds of the estate.
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Harold Was Never Nominated as Personal Representative- None of the statuu
to which Harold has cited support Harold's argument that the phrase "nominated as personal
representative" in the attorneys fees statute makes reference to one who has priority for append
Instead, in each and every case to which Harold has cited, the individual entitled to his/her >i fees was either (a) actually appointed by the court as personal representative, or (b) was actin<> as
personal representative pursuant to a nomination in the deceased's will. The statute that <uiuw:> i ^
to individuals nominated in a will is predicated in the notion that such individuals have a fiduciary
duty to defend the document which appointed them:
. . . [T]he personal representative of an estate has a duty to defend the valid'* v of t!?°
decedent's will if the will is challenged. The Arizona Supreme Court stau
Monaghan's Estate, 60 Ariz. 346, 351-52, 137R2d390, 391-92 (1943.
executor appointed by will... must in duty to his trust, protect the instrument when
it is assailed in court." More recently, the supreme court affirmed this rule in In re
Harber's Estate, 104 Ariz. 79, 89, 449 P.2d 7,17 (1969), when it adopted the n i*. s '<
forth in In re Corotto, 125 Cal App 2d 314, 270 P.2d 498 (Cal App 1°5 » **•
"after a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the executor to defend and
uphold it against subsequent attack, and that this duty rests primarily upon J «.
not the legatees and devisees." Even if the will is challenged before [* * * 141 it is
admitted to probate and a personal representative appointed, the personal
representative named in the will has the duty to defend in a will contest. In re Pitt's
Estate, 1 Ariz. App. 533, 541, 405 R2d 471, 479 (1965). Thus, as the personal
representative named in the will, Marion clearly had a duty to defend Mrs. Killen's
will in the will contest
In re Kitten, 188 Ariz. 569,937 VM1375 (1996) (emphasis added) (cited in Harold's Memorandum
at pp. 6 and 7). Thus, one who is nominated as a personal representative in a will and who \ , «•»*
fiduciary obligations imposed by the document should be allowed "to in good faith pursue
appropriate legal proceedings without unfairly compelling the representative to risk ^ r r '^ , , ; | 1
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financial loss by underwriting the expenses of those proceedings." Estate of Flaherty, 484 N.W.2d
515 (N.D. 1992) (cited by Harold at p. 6 of his Memorandum).
The Editorial Board Comment to §75-3-719, the attorneys fees statute on which Harold has
relied, reflects this need to protect those who have fiduciary obligations imposed by nomination in
a will:
A personal representative is a fiduciary for successors of the estate (§75-3703). Though the will naming him may not yet be probated, the priority for
appointment conferred by §75-3-203 on one named executor in a probated will
means that that the person named has an interest, as a fiduciary, in seeking the
probate of the will.... {T]he Code changes the idea followed in some jurisdictions
that an executor lacks standing to contest other wills which, ifvalid, would supersede
the will naming him, and standing to oppose other contests that may be mounted
against the instrument nominating him.
§75-3-719 Ed. Bd. Comment (emphasis added).
It is apparentfromthis comment that the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code as well as the
Utah Legislature intended by this statute only to protect thefiduciaryresponsibilities of persons
actually named as personal representative or persons named as a personal representative in a will.
In the absence of thosefiduciaryresponsibilities, the statute has no application. There is no question
that Harold was not nominated in Jamie's Will as the personal representative. Thus, Harold had no
fiduciary obligation to effectuate Jamie's intent as expressed in that Will.
Priority for Appointment Does Not Create Status as "A Person Nominated As Personal
Representative." Harold claims status as "a person nominated as personal representative" only
because he had priority for appointment Harold has cited to nothing in support of that claim. But
by definition, thefiduciaryobligations of one who has been nominated as personal representative
do not attach simply as a result of having priority under the statute. A "fiduciary" is defined as "a
5
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person having duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit in matters
connected with such undertaking." Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Ed. (1979). One who acts in a
'"fiduciary capacity" does not act for "his own benefit, but for the benefit of another person." Id.
And a '"nominee" . . .
• . . ordinarily indicates one designated to act for another as his representative in a
rather limited sense. It is used sometimes to signify an agent or trustee. It has no
connotation, however, other than that of acting for another, in representation of
another, or as the grantee of another.

Cisco v. Van Lew, 60 CaLApp.2d 575, 584; 141 P.2d 433,438 (1943) (emphasis added), quoting
Schuh TradingCo. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 95F.2d404, 411, (7th Cir. 1938).
Fiduciary duties do not attach simply as a result of having priority under the statute. For
example, a surviving spouse of the decedent who is a devisee has priority for appointment over other
devisees or heirs. §75-3-201(b). But this same surviving devisee spouse who is not nominated by
the will as personal representative has nofiduciaryobligation to submit the will for probate. Instead,
the surviving spouse may exercise his/her right to take an elective share of the estate pursuant to §752-201 and allow the other devisees to take steps to probate the will. See, e.g., In re Little, 22 Utah
204,61 P. 899 (1900) (renunciation by widow of herrightsunder deceased spouse's will does not
nullify other devisees'rightto take un&er will).
Harold was not a nominee for anyone and had nofiduciaryduty to anyone. In accordance
with his own argument, as the sole intestate heir, he had the ability to be directly appointed. His
petition reflects that that is exactly what he did - apply directly for appointment. Thus, he is not "a
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person nominated as personal representative" ~ and he is not entitled to his attorneys fees under the
statute.
Harold Acted Only In His Own Personal Self-Interest. Regardless, Harold still asserts
(without authority) that he did, in fact, have a fiduciary obligation — one which he owed to the estate.
(Harold's Memorandum, p. 5). Harold does not assert that he undertook to safekeep property of the
estate or to pursue claims on behalf of the estate for recovery of property. What he asserts is that he
fulfilled hisfiduciaryobligation by seeking a court order "determining who inherited the estate." l
(Harold's Memorandum, p. 5). In other words, he filed the initial petition seeking an order of
intestacy — as well as a determination that he was the sole heir. The petition was a form document —
his attorney could have prepared it in less than an hour. All of the rest of Harold's involvement in
this case was spent in attempting to defeat Jamie's intent and to prevent Jamie's Will from being
probated. These efforts were taken in direct contravention of the purposes and policies underlying
the Probate Code, which are, in part, "to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in
distribution of his property" and to do so in an efficient and speedy manner. §75-l-102(2)(b) and
(c). The fact that Harold beat Jeff to the courthouse steps and filed his petition first does not
transmute his subsequent selfish efforts into some pretentiousfiduciaryresponsibility to the estate.
If that were so, then anyone could file a petition in intestacy and challenge a will, all at no risk. The
"good faith" required by the attorneys fees statute is a very low standard — any challenge, no matter

1

Harold asserts that the presumption of intestacy that accompanied the loss of Jamie's
Will somehow affects his responsibilities to the estate. In fact, the presumption of intestacy
applies in all probate proceedings - until a will is probated, the decedent is presumed to have
died intestate. Linger v. Upshaw Co., 144 S.E.2d 689,696 (W.Va. 1965). The presumption
becomes final after three years in the absence of a probated will. U.C.A. §75-3-107(3).
7
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how attenuated, that met at least Rule 11 requirements, would require all will contests to be made
solely at the expense of the estate.
The law does not support Harold's argument. In none of the cases that Harold has cited was
the will contestant, successful or not, awarded attorneys fees. Instead, each and every case to which
Harold has cited indicates that the estate will pay for the fees of one who has a fiduciary obligation
to pursue litigation on behalf of the estate — an obligation that arises out of a formal appointment as
personal representative or as one who has been nominated by a will to be personal representative.
See, Webster v. Webster, 268 Md. 153,299 A.2d 814 (1973) (cited at p. 5 of Harold's Memorandum)
(personal representative nominated in will and appointed by court allowed attorneys fees incurred
in defending will); In re Kitten, 188 Ariz. 569, 937 P.2d 1375 (1996) (cited at pp. 6 and 7 of
Harold's Memorandum) (same); Estate of Flaherty, 484N.W.2d 515 (N.D. 1992) (cited at p. 6 of
Harold's Memorandum) (same); Matter ofEstate ofPeterson, 561 N.W.2d 618 (N.D. 1997), (cited
at p. 6 of Harold's Memorandum) (same); In re Estate ofReimer, 229 Neb. 406, 427 N.W.2d 293
(1988) (cited at p. 4 of Harold's Memorandum) (individual who was allowed to collect attorneys fees
for will contest had been nominated in the will as personal representative and defended the contested
will); Estate ofVaughan, 270 P. 1030 (Wash 1928) (cited at p. 6 of Harold's Memorandum) (same);
Salmon v. Salmon, 395 S.W2d 29,33 (Tex. 1965) (cited at p. 6 of Harold's Memorandum) (same);
In re Swanson, 240 Iowa 1011, 38 N.W. 2d 652 (1949) (cited at p. 6 of Harold's Memorandum)
(individuals nominated in will as executors entitled to attorneys fees incurred in defending will); In
re Stenson, 792 P.2d 1119 (Mont. 1990) (personal representative appointed by court entitled to
attorneys fees in pursuing heirship proceedings); In re Ashton, 898 P.2d 824 (Utah App. 1995)

8
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(personal representative appointed by court not awarded attorneys fees incurred in pursuing own
personal interests in having property pass to her outside of the estate).
In none of the cases cited was the will contestant awarded attorneys fees for the challenge.
Absent the fiduciary obligations that accompany formal court appointment as a personal
representative or the nomination in a will, an intestate heir who challenges a will is acting in one's
own personal self-interest. In the instant case, Harold fought tooth and nail to prevent Jamie's intent
from being effectuated. Harold's efforts were in direct contravention of the best interests of the
estate — nothing that Harold did was calculated to ensure that Jamie's intent was carried ou
Everything that Harold did was done in his own self-interest that Jamie's intent not be effectuated,
but that the estate be determined to pass intestate to Harold.
Harold Did Not Have Priority for Appointment as Personal Representative. Pursuant
to §75-3-203, it was Jeff, and not Harold, who had priority to be appointed as personal
representative.

That statute states that "persons who are not disqualified have priority for

appointment in the following order: (a) the person with priority as determined by a probated will,
including a person nominated by a power conferred in a will; - . . ( e ) other heirs of the decedent"
Unquestionably, since Jamie's Will not only nominated Jeff as the personal representative, but the
Will was also probated, Jeff had and has priority for appointment
Harold Does Not Fall Within the Class of Individuals To Whom the Statute Allowing
Attorneys Fees is Directed. As set forth above, Harold was not "a person nominated as personal
representative" and is not entitled to his fees pursuant to §75-3-719.

9

A-22

2.

HAROLD WAIVED ANY CLAIM THAT HE MAY HAVE HAD TO
RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES.

Harold has waived his claim to attorneys fees in this will contest by not pleadinp n .
raising it until after the close of evidence. While no technical forms of pleadings »
required under Rule 8(e), U.R.Civ.P., Utah is a notice pleading state. To present
attorneys fees, Harold had to have at least made passing reference to the claim in his opening petition
or at least in response to Jeffs cross-petition. See, Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 111 o n TtpVi
1982) (prayer for attorneys fees set out in counterclaim is sufficient to preserve cl?
failed to assert any claim for fees, Harold is now prevented from raising the issue.
Harold has further waived his claim for attorneys fees by failing to present any evidence at
trial concerning them. Failure to present evidence on a claim at issue is generally viewed as a w<a \ ei
of the claim. Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382,1391 (Utah 1982). Harold made
no reference to attorneys fees until his post-trial motion, and has yet to present any evidence thereon.
Even to the extent that Harold could be considered to be a "person nominated as personal
representative" (which he is not), Harold has waived any right to assert his claim for fees in this
proceeding.

CONCLUSION
7

or the foregoing reasons, Harold's Motion for Attorneys Fees should be denied.

10
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DATED this J ^ _ day of July, 1998.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

Attorneys for Jeffrey Paul Hupe
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
was hand-delivered on this \* day of July, 1998, to the following:
Kent B. Alderman, Esq.
Elizabeth S. Conley, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE, & LATIMER, P.C.
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
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ELIZABETH S. CONLEY (4815)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

In the Matter of the Estate of

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES

JAMIE HUPE

Case No. 973300019 ES

Deceased.

* * * * * * *

Harold Hupe ("Mr. Hupe"), by and through his counsel, submits the following REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES.
INTRODUCTION
Public policy as reflected in the uniform probate code supports Mr. Hupe claim for
attorneys fees in his petition for appointment as personal representative of the estate of Jamie
Hupe and defense against Jeff Hupe's ("Jeff") cross petition.

220266.1

A-25

The uniform probate code sets out rules governing how the property of one generation
shall be transferred to another. A will may be presented for probate or in the absence of a will
then intestate provisions govern the transfer of the estate.
In this case no will or copy of a will was ever produced. More than six months after
decedent's death, Mr. Hupe filed for probate. Jeff Hupe, the proponent of a will claimed that
there was a lost holographic will naming him as personal representative and sole heir. However,
Jeff did not file for probate of the lost will until after Mr. Hupe's petition was filed. There was
insufficient evidence to establish that a lost will had been made, properly executed and not
revoked. As the sole intestate heir of the estate Mr. Hupe was the logical person to seek to
administer the estate. In that context Mr. Hupe filed his petition. In order to bring the estate to a
conclusion, it was appropriate for Mr. Hupe, the sole intestate heir, to file his petition and to
insure that the estate passed as it was intended. Mr. Hupe's defense against Jeffs cross petition
effected that purpose.
ARGUMENT

L

MIL HUPE IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE ESTATE OF
. JAMIE HUPE BECAUSE HE SERVED THE ESTATE IN MAKING THE
PROPONENT OF A LOST WILL ESTABLISH THE FACT THAT A WILL HAD
BEEN PROPERLY EXECUTED AND NOT REVOKED.
Jeff argues that Mr. Hupe is not a "person nominated as personal representative." He

argues that in order to be a "person nominated as personal representative" one must provide
benefit to the estate (Jeffs Memorandum, p. 2), be nominated as personal representative (Jeffs
Memorandum, p. 4), and not act out of self-interest (Jeffs Memorandum, p. 7). However, Jeffs

220266.1
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argument fails to acknowledge that at the time Mr. Hupe acted on behalf of the estate, the will
Jeff relies upon was under considerable question since it is a holographic will and the testator's
intent was yet to be established through witness testimony.
A,

Because No Will or Copy of the Will Was Ever Produced. No Attorney or Witness
to the Execution of the Will Came Forward. It was Necessary to Demand that Jeff
Present Suffirient Evidence of a Lost Will.

When Mr. Hupe sought to probate the estate of Jamie Hupe there was no will recognized
by law. This feet is essential to the question of attorney fees because had the will been available
and legally recognized, there would have been no question as to whose role it was to care for the
estate. Jeff objected to Mr. Hupe's efforts to informally probate the estate, arguing that a lost will
was prepared. Two fiiends of Jeffs testified that they saw a will in decedent's handwriting but
did not remember who the witnesses ware or who notarized the wilL Certainly, anyone would
question the validity of a lost holographic will in such attenuated circumstances. When Mr. Hupe
acted on behalf of Jamie Hupe's estate, the lost will was not legally recognized and, therefore, Mr.
Hupe acted reasonably in not relying on what Jeffsfiiendssaid was in the will
B.

Mr. Hiipe Stood As fr? N^piin^ perppnal Representative with Fiduciary
Responsibilities in RepresentingfoftRotate

The law does not define a "person nominate as personal representative." In the absence of
a dear definition, Mr. Hupe relied upon hisfidudaiyobligation as the sole intestate heir in seeking
to probate the estate. Jeff uses Blade's Law Dictionary to argue that Mr. Hupe had no fidudaiy
obligation. (Jeffs Memorandum, p. 6). However, he refuses to recognize that at the time of Mr.
220266.1
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Hupe's actions, Mr. Hupe was the sole heir to the estate and was preferred over all others
interested in becoming the personal representative.

See. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-203 (1997)

(giving priority to heirs of the estate in absence of a probated will or surviving spouse). Even the
Editorial Board Comment Jeff refers to in his Opposition states that a personal representative has
a fiduciary duty to seek probate. §75-3-719 Ed. Bd. Comment (cited in Jeff's Memorandum, p.
5).
C.

Until The Lost Will Was Admitted to Probate. The Estate Could Not Be
Concluded.

Jeff makes every effort to convince this court that Mr. Hupe did not benefit the estate.
However, this determination must be made by considering the facts at the time the services were
rendered. Mr. Hupe took the most efficient and cost effective means of probating the estate and
seeking resolution of questions regarding the validity of the lost will. Jeff merely wishes he had
not been forced to meet his legal obligation of proving the validity of the lost will. By seeking
probate and defending the estate in consideration of a lost will, Mr. Hupe insured that the
testator's intent is followed.
Jeff refers to Estate of Ambers. 477 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1991) as instructing in the issue of
attorney fees for a personal representative. (Jeffs Memorandum, p. 3). However, the fects are
dissimilar. In Ambers the challengers to the estate daimed that a 1955 will should control over a
1989 will, claiming undue influence. The court points out that the challengers used a contingency
fee arrangement with the devisees of the 1955 will, seemingly indicating that the challengers had
no real interest in justly determining the testators intent.

220266.1
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challengers in Ambers. In fact, Mr. Hupe resembles the individual nominated as personal
representative whom the court awarded attorney fees against the challengers.
Jeff argues that Mr. Hupe was never nominated as personal representative and therefore
the cases we cite were not effective because they all deal with persons appointed or nominated in
wills. (Jeffs Memorandum, p. 4). Jeff emphasized the Arizona Supreme Court's statement that
"[e]ven if the will is challenged before it is admitted to probate and a personal representative
appointed, the personal representative named in the will has the duty to defend in a will contest."
In re Kitten. 188 Ariz. 569, 937 P.2d 1375 (1996). However, had Mr. Hupe prevailed at trial,
then the cases cited in his memorandum would apply equally to Jeff Hupe. The only difference in
application of the case law is the issue of who was proposing a will. It is not logical to say that a
proponent of a will who does not prevail may, nevertheless, be awarded attorneys fees but not an
opponent of a will. This argument particularly lades credibility in light of the fact that no will or
copy of a will was ever presented to the court.
Mr. Hupe's actions ultimately benefited the estate. The purpose and policy of the Probate
Code is "to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property"
and to do so in an efficient and speedy manner. Utah Code Ann. §75-l-102(2)(b) and (c). Again,
in looking at the facts at the time of Mr. Hupe's services, Mr. Hupe used all possible means to
detenmne the intent of Jamie Hupe in an efficient and speedy manner. Afterfilingfor informal
probate, Mr. Hupe moved for summary judgment in order to effidently determine the validity of
the lost will

220266.1
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E.

A MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES IS NOT WAIVED SO LONG AS IT IS
MADE PRIOR TO THE SIGNED ENTRY OF JUDGMENT,
In a recent Utah case the Supreme Court set out a bright line test for the time when a

motion for attorneys fees must be made. In Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower 343 Utah Adv. Rep.
27 (Utah, 1998), the court states that the time in which a motion for attorneys fees must be filed
is the signed entry offinaljudgment The court noted three policy reason for its decisioa First,
requiring parties to present evidence of attorneys fees at trial would contravene judicial economy.
Second, determination of reasonable attorneys fees is an issue generally left to the discretion of
the court. Third, there must be a time offinalitywhen a claim for attorney fees must be raised or
waived.

"That time is the signed entry of final judgment." Id At 29, citing Fair Housing

Advocates Ass'n v. James. 682 N.E.2d 1045,1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
CONCLUSION
In this case Mr. Hupe was acting as the nominee personal representative in Iris status as
sole intestate heir of the estate. Before a distribution of the estate could occur, a court order
identifying the heir of the estate had to be entered. As the sole heir in an intestate succession, Mr.
Hupe was qualified to be nominated as personal representative and absent Jeff Hupe's contest
would have been so appointed. Mr. Hupefiledhis petition not, in a rush to the courthouse steps,
but more than six months after decedent's death. In a situation that could not be resolved by
summary judgment, it was reasonable for Mr. Hupe to insist that the fact of a lost will be firmly
established. He did so and the estate was benefited.

220266.1
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DATED this OX day of July, 1998.

EL1ZAB©H S. CONLEY

Q

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 5 5 day of Ju£* 1998,1 caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES to the foUowing:
Leslie Van Frank, Esq.
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East 100 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah
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No._

IN AND FOR SIMUT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: :

MINUTE ENTRY

HUPE, JAMIE PETER
(Deceased)

CASE NO. 973300019

:

For the reasons set forth below, Harold Hupe's Motion for
Attorney's Fees Is denied.
Mr* Hupe seeks an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the
Utah Probate Code (*Codejr) section which states, *If any personal
representative or person nominated as a personal representative
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether
successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his
necessary

expenses

and

disbursements,

including

reasonable

attorney's fees incurred," Utah Code Ann., Section 75-3-719 (1997) .
Mr. Hupe was neither the personal representative of the Estate of
Jamie Hupe, nor a person nominated as a personal representative and
is not, therefore/ eligible to recover fees under this section.
Contrary to the assertions made in Mr. Hupe's Memoranda In Support
of his Motion for Attorney's Fees, he never held the status as a
"nominee" to be the personal representative of Jamie Hupe's Estate.
A nominee, to be a personal representative, is a person whose
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candidacy for appointment is the result of an act of *an individual
and not by operation of law.

This distinction is reinforced in

Utah Code Ann., Section 75-3-203, which establishes priority among
those seeking appointment as personal representative. This section
consistently uses the term ^nominate" or one of its allied forms,
in the context of describing the acts of individuals, be they
decedents speaking through a will, minors, or conservators.

A

nominee refers, in almost every context, legal or otherwise, to a
specific person designated by name. As used in the Code, a nominee
can be distinguished from a class of persons defined by the nature
of their relationship to a decedent who are rendered eligible for
designation as a personal representative by operation of law.
The distinction between nominees and candidates for personal
representative who acquire their status by operation of law can be
harmonized easily by the statutory objectives of Utah Code Ann*,
Section 75-3-719 •

A bona fide nominee, having been expressly

singled out by a decedent to serve as personal representative/ is
likely to feel duty-bound to resist challenges to the decedent's
express desires.1 When made in good faith, a nominee's defense of
Estate of Ambers. 477 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1991), does not alter
this observation. In that case, the alleged nominee's claim to
status as personal representative, together with his assertion of
entitlement to attorney's fees based on that claim were rejected
because the decedent's will and the personal representative's
nomination were fraudulently procured.
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his claim to be appointed personal representative is, therefore,
subject to the provisions of Utah Code Ann*, Section 75-3-719.
Moreover, I am persuaded of the merits of the argument made by
Jeffrey Hupe that while a fiduciary duty inevitably attaches to a
nominee, the same cannot be said for a candidate as personal
representative who has acquired his status by operation of law.
Jeff Hupe's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with
this Minute Entry.
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MAILINS CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, this_^2"*
day of October, 1998:

Leslie Van Frank
Attorney for Petitioner Jeffrey Paul Hupe
525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Kent B. Alderman
Elizabeth S. Conley
Attorneys for Harold Francis Hupe
201 S. Main, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84145-0898
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Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913)
Bradley M. Strassberg (Bar No. 7994)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008
Telephone: (801)532-2666
Attorneys for Petitioner, Jeffrey Paul Hupe

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR ATTORNEYS FEES

HUPE, JAMIE PETER,
(Deceased)

Case No. 973300019ES
i

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=
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=

=

=

=

=

=
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The motion of Harold Hupe for attorneys fees having come before the Court, the Court
having reviewed the parties' memoranda and having previously entered its minute entry denying
the same, and for good cause otherwise appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Harold Hupe's Motion for Attorneys Fees is denied.
DATED this

day of October, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

Ronald E. Nehring
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER, P.C.

Elizabeth S. Conley, Esq.
Attorneys for Harold Hupe
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
ct

was hand-delivered on thisP-/ " day of October, 1998, to the following:
Kent B. Alderman, Esq.
Elizabeth S. Conley^ Esq.

PARSONS, BEHLE, & LATIMER, P.C.
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Attorneys for Harold Francis Hupe
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ELIZABETH S. CONLEY (4815)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

In the Matter ofthe Estate of

I

JAMIE HUPE
Deceased.

MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DENIAL OF
ATTORNEY FEES
Case No. 973300019 ES

* * * * * * *

Harold Hupe ("Mr. Hupe"), by and through bis counsel, submits me following MOTION
TO RECONSIDER DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES.
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Hupe requests mis Court reconsider its denial of attomey fees and grant him attorney
fees for the following reasons. First, the Utah Uniform Probate Code requires award of attorney
fees to personal representatives for probate proceedings prosecuted or defended in good faith,
regardless of their outcome. Second, Mr. Hupe is entitled to attorney fees because his actions to
probate the estate benefited the estate as a whole. Third, equity demands mat the estate bear the
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cost of the decedent's own failure to make sure that his testamentary intent was properly
documented. Fourth, denial of attorney fees in this situation discourages interested persons from
involving themselves in probate proceedings and threatens the Uniform Probate Code's policy
objective of ensuring that the testamentary intent of decedents is promptly and accurately
determined through probate proceedings.
ARGUMENT
L THE UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE ENTITLES PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES TO BE REIMBURSED FOR THE EXPENSES OF GOOD
FAITH PROBATE PROCEEDINGS, REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF
THOSE PROCEEDINGS.
The Utah Uniform Probate Code states: "If any personal representative or person
nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith,
whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and
disbursements, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719
(1997). This statutory language clearly contemplates that there will be meaningful provision for
award of attorneys fees on a case-by-case basis, and not that attorney fees will be awarded by law
to whichever party ultimately prevails in the probate proceeding. Nonetheless, Jeff Hupe has
argued, and the court has apparently accepted, that attorneys fees should not be awarded to a
person with priority for appointment under the statute who comes forward to probate the will but
is not ultimately appointed as the personal representative. This result is both inequitable and
contrary to the clear policy objects of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.

23774S.1
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Mr. Hupe came forward six months after the decedent's death to probate the estate. At
the time Mr. Hupe applied for appointment as personal representative, Jeff Hupe had not
produced the holographic will or initiated any probate proceeding, and was not an interested
person with standing to participate in the probate proceedings. Thus Mr. Hupe was the only
person with standing to act as personal representative and prosecute probate proceedings on
behalf of the estate. To argue, in hindsight, that the estate should not reimburse Mr. Hupe's
attorneys fees because the court ultimately admitted a later-discovered will into probate that
named Jeff Hupe, instead of Mr. Hupe, as the personal representative, creates the dangerous
precedent that applicants for personal representative whose applications are successfully
challenged may not seek reimbursement for legal expenditures made in good faith to probate the
estate in the face of questionable alleged wills. Such a rule would force personal representatives
in intestacy to chose between withdrawing fiom the proceedings and allowing the proponents of
alleged testamentary instruments to go forward uncontested, or proceeding with probate in the
knowledge that if die challenge to probate is successful, he will be forced to bear all of the costs
ofprobate.
H. MR. HUPE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE HIS ACTIONS TO
PROBATE THE ESTATE WERE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE ESTATE AS A
WHOLE.
Mr. Hupe is also entitled to attorney fees in this case because his actions in probating the
intestate estate benefited the estate as a whole. Jeff Hupe cites numerous cases denying attorney
fees to unsuccesstiil individual claimants in contested probate proceedings. However, these
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cases are dissimilar from the Hupe case because they involved disputes solely over the
distribution of estate assets under uncontested testamentary instruments. In contrast, the issue in
this case was the validity of a lost holographic will last seen in the hands of the decedent.
Numerous states have held that "[t]he services of counsel in preventing distribution under invalid
testamentary instruments must be held to confer a benefit upon the estate." The New Mexico
Appeals Court dealt with this issue in In Re Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 713, 699 P.2d 638,
644 (N.M Ct App. 1985). In that case, the New Mexico Appeals Court held that litigation to
contest an alleged will benefited the decedent's estate as a whole because such litigation
"protected the assets of the estate from being distributed pursuant to an invalid will." Id, 699
P.2d at 644. Similarly, In Re Estate of Kaschor. 637 P^d 855 (OkL 1981) litigation to prevent
the probate of an invalid will is a benefit to the entire estate, Sre In Re Limberg's Estate, 257
App. Div. 827,11 N.Y. S. 2d 908,909 (1939),
Jeff Hupe appears to argue that Mr, Hupe's actions were for his own benefit, rather than
for the benefit of the estate, merely because Mr, Hupe would have been the decedents heir in
intestacy. However, this argument applies equally to Jeff Hi5>e, who was the sole heir under the
lost holographic will. The Uniform Probate Code gives priority as personal representative to the
heirs or devisees of decedents, and it is thus inevitable that participants in probate proceedings
will act both in the estate's interest and in their own interest Jeff Hupe's suggestion that Mr.
Hupe's status as an heir in intestacy should bar him from recovering fees creates a dangerous
precedent and runs counter to the basic structure of the Uniform Probate Code, which mandates
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that the participants in probate proceedings must be limited to those persons with a financial
interest in the proceedings. Furthermore, it contradicts established case law in Utah and other
jurisdictions mandating award of attorney fees to persons whose actions benefit the estate in
probate.
m. EQUITY DEMANDS THAT THE ESTATE RATHER THAN MR. HUPE BEAR
THE COST OF THE DECEDENT'S OWN FAILURE TO MAKE SURE THAT HIS
TESTAMENTARY INTENT WAS PROPERLY DOCUMENTED.
Equity also demands that Mr. Hupe be reimbursed for fees incurred to probate the estate
in this case. A fundamental tenet of probate law is that the estate should bear the necessary costs
of its own administration. The cost of contesting the alleged lost holographic will is a cost
created by the estate in this case, and not a cost created by Mr. Hupe. Mr. Hupe was not
responsible for causing this proceeding. The ultimate responsibility for this proceeding rests
with the decedent, who either failed to produce a will or lost or destroyed the alleged holographic
wilL
Jeff Hupe argues that because Mr. Hupe's petition for appointment as personal
representative was ultimately defeated in the course of the probate proceedings, Mr. Hupe had no
fiduciary duty to probate the estate and is not entitled to reimbursement for any of the necessary
probate expenses. However, the result of this position is that, because of Jeff Hupe's ultimately
successful challenge, the estate itself is relieved of any responsibility for its own probate costs.
This result is both inequitable and contrary to the principle that th estate should pay its own
necessary costs of administration in probate.
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IV. DENIAL OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN THIS SITUATION CREATES A
DISINCENTIVE FOR HEIRS TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN PROBATE
PROCEEDINGS, AND THREATENS THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE'S
POLICY OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING THAT THE TESTAMENTARY INTENT
OF DECEDENTS IS PROMPTLY AND ACCURATELY DETERMINED
THROUGH PROBATE PROCEEDINGS.
Finally, denial of attorney fees in this case contradicts the purposes of the Utah Uniform
Probate Code, The purpose of the Utah Uniform Probate code is to "to discover and make
effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property." Utah Code Ann, § 75-l-102(b)
(1996). A key means to accomplish this purpose is the involvement of interested persons as
personal representatives to administer the estate and pursue probate proceedings. By denying
Mr. Hupe's attorney fees, this court has established the precedent that the party who prevails in
any contested probate proceeding will automatically be awarded attorney fees. This precedent
contradicts that clear language of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, which entitled personal
representatives to reimbursement of all necessary expenses incurred, whether in successful or
unsuccessful actions. More fundamentally, however, this ruling means that interested persons
who seek appointment as personal representative must bear the risk that if their appointment is
successfully contested, the estate will have no obligation to pay any of their attorney fees.
Imposing this level of risk on individuals seeking appointment as personal representative creates
a strong disincentive for interested persons to come forward in any probate proceedings that they
suspect might be contested Such a result seriously undercuts the stated purpose of the Uniform
Probate Code by creating a situation in which parties undertaking probate of intestate wills could
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do so only at the risk of incurring unreimbursed legal fees in the event a later-discovered will
was ultimately accepted into probate.
CONCLUSION
Denial of attorneys fees to Mr. Hupe is contrary to the plain language and policy
objectives of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. Furthermore, it creates an inequitable result
insofar as itrequiresMr. Hupe to pay necessary costs of administering the estate in probate. Jeff
Hupe's characterization of Mr. Hupe's actions as self-serving is based solely on the court's
subsequent determination to admit the lost will into probate, and this characterization does not
reflect the reality of the case at the time these actions were taken. This is not a case, like those
Jeff Hupe has cited, in which the only dispute is over division of property under an uncontested
testamentaiy instrument Rather, Mr. Hupe's actions in contesting the lost holographic will were
a good faith effort to ensure that the estate was distributed in accordance with the testamentary
intent of the decedent

For the above reasons, Mr. Hupe respectfully requests this court

reconsider its order denying attorney fees.
DATED this yf^tiw

of October, 1998.

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner Harold Hupe
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

of October, 1998, I caused to be hand

delivered, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO RECONSIDER DENIAL OF
ATTORNEY FEES to the following:
Leslie Van Frank, Esq.
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East 100 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah

fyfaAfaflk. (**£*>/
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Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Facsimile: (801)355-1813
Attorneys for Petitioner, Jeffiey Paul Hupe

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
HUPE, JAMIE PETER,
(Deceased)

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
HAROLD HUPE'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER DENIAL OF
ATTORNEYSFEES
- ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED CaseNo.973300019ES
Hon. Ronald E. Nehring

Jeffiey P. Hupe ("Jeff"), by and through his undersigned counsel, files the following
Memorandum in Opposition to Harold Hupe's ("Harold") Motionto Reconsider Denial ofAttorneys
Fees.
A, HAROLD'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE
IT IS NOTHING MORE THAN AN ATTEMPTED
SECOND "BITE AT THE APPLE"
While motionstoreconsider are allowed under Rule 54(b) when afinaljudgment has not yet
been entered, a litigant who hopestochange the court's mind should be prepaidtodemonstrate mat
at least one of the following factors is present:
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(1) the matter is presented in a 'different light' or under 'different circumstances;' (2) there
has been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) "manifest
injustice" will result if the court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to
correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by
the court.
Tremblyv. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306,1311,(UtahCtApp. 1994), quoting State v. O'Neill,
848 P.2d 694,697, fa. 2 (Utah CtApp.) cert den., 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). Harold has not only
failed to cite to this controlling law, he has also completely failed to demonstrate that any of the
Trembly factors is present
The arguments that Harold has raised in his Motion to Reconsider either could have been
raised in the original Motion for Attorneys Fees, or were fully briefed that original motion and have
already been rejected by this Court As such, Harold has failed to meet the requirements of Rule
54(b) for reconsideration of his original motion.
B. HAROIJD'S ARGUMENT THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO HIS FEES
BECAUSE OF HIS ALLEGED PRIORITY FOR APPOINTMENT
AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE UNDER THE PROBATE CODE
HAS ALREADY BEEN REJECTED BY THIS COURT.
Harold asserts in his both hisfirstand fourth points set forth in his MotiontoReconsider that
as the applicant for status as personalrepresentativeofthe estate, he is entitied to hk
The Court has already considered and rgected this argument As the Court has recognized and ruled,
the statute on which Harold has predicated his request for attorneys fees allows "personal
representatives" and "persons iKHiiinated as personal repress
incurred. U.OA. §75-3-719 (1997). Harold is neither - he was not appointed as personal
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representative, nor Jamie ever nominate him as personal representative. Thus, Harold is not eligible
under the statute for an award of fees.1
Harold has not challenged the Court's careful statutory analysis of this point, but rather
argues that the Court's ruling creates a disincentive for interested persons to seek intestacy probate,
because they may be forced in the face of a proffered will to choose from withdrawing from the
proceedings orriskbearing their own attorneys fees in an unsuccessful challenge to a will. (See
Harold's Motion at pps. 3 and 6). On its face, this may be an argument for lobbying the legislature
to change the statute. But it is not a basis on which Harold can urge this Court to ignore the statutory
language of §75-3-719 and reverse its prior ruling against Harold.
Moreover, an analysis of Harold's argument reveals that Harold does not take into
consideration the opposite effects of hisriskanalysis. By allowing attorneys fees to be paid out of
the estatetounsuccessful will challengers, the law would encourage those who stand to benefit from
the rejection of a will to raise even the most attenuated challenges to its probate. Thus, both sides
of all will contests would funded solely at the expense of the estate. As Jeff explained in his prior
opposition to Harold's original motion, the law does not support Harold's position. (See pps. 7-9
of Jeffs Memorandum in Opposition to Harold's Motion for Attorney's Fees). Harold has yet to
cite to a case in which an unsuccessful will contestant who was not a court-appointed personal
representative or nominated as the personal representative in the will has been awarded his attorneys
1

In his reconsideration motion, Harold repeats his assertion that he was the only person
with standing to act as personalrepresentativeand prosecute probate proceedings on behalf of the
estate. (Harold's Motion to Reconsider, p. 3). This is incorrect As Jeff pointed out in his
opposition to Harold's original motion, as the person nominated in Jamie's Will as personal
representative, Jeff had not only standing, but priority over Harold for appointment as personal
representative. (Jeff's Memorandum in Opposition to Harold's Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 9)
3
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fees. None of the cases that Harold cited in his original motion awarded attorneys fees to such an
individual (See p. 8 of Jeffs Memorandum in Opposition to Harold's Motion for Attorney's Fees).
Nor do any of the three new cases that Harold has cited. Estate of Foster, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d
638 (1985) awarded attorneys fees to will contestants, several of whom had been appointed by the
court as special co-administrators, who were successful in preventing the will from being probated.
In re Limbergs Estate, 257 App.Div. 827, 11 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1939) also involved the award of
attorneys fees to the successful challengers. And as for Estate ofKaschor, 637 P.2d 855 (Okl. 1981),
the court denied attorneys fees to the will challengers, even though they were successful.
Finally, Harold's argument that the Court's ruling creates a disincentive for interested persons
in general to challenge wills is wholly disingenuous in the context of this litigation. Harold himself
had tremendous incentive to challenge Jamie's Will — if Harold had succeeded in his efforts to
challenge Jamie's Will, Harold would not only have been entitled tohave the estate reimburse him
his fees, but Harold would have inherited Jamie's entire estate. The risk that Harold undertook in
this case is no different than that which many civil litigants undertake — if you win, you might be
awarded your attorney's fees, but if you lose, then the court will not award your fees.
C HAROLD'S ARGUMENT THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO HIS FEES
BECAUSE HE BENEFITED THE ESTATE HAS ALREADY BEEN REJECTED.
Although the benefit that Harold provided to the estate was challenged in the original motion
that Harold filed and ultimately rejected by this Court, Harold cites to three new cases in his Motion
to Reconsider in support of his proposition that one who benefits the estate is entitled to an award
of his fees. As set forth above, none of these three new cases involved the award of attorneys fees
to individuals who unsuccessfully challenged a will One of the cases denied attorneys fees to
4
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successful will challengers. Estate ofKaschor, supra. The other two cases indicate that a court may
award attorneys fees under its equitable powers, but to will contestants who are successful in their
efforts to prevent an invalid will from being probated. In re Limberg's Estate, supra; Estate of
Foster, supra.
An analysis of Foster and Limberg reveals that these courts were willing to award attorneys
fees to the successful will contestant because it would be unfair to require one will contestant to bear
the burden of all the attorneys fees at the expense of the other intestate heirs who benefittedfromthe
will contestant's efforts. As the court in Limberg stated:
If an allowance out of the general assets were denied, an anomalous situation would
ensue. A contestant would then have to bear the expense for the attorneys' fees out
of his own share despite the fact that his efforts resulted in equal benefit to all
remaining distributees, who would thereupon profit by their inaction.
In re Limberg's Estate, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The Foster court quoted Limberg, explaining that all
of the intestate heirs had benefitedfromthe services of the challenging attorneys. Estate of Foster,
699P.2dat646.
Charging the estate with the attorneys fees in the circumstances described in Foster and
Limberg is peihaps reasonable under the circumstances set forth in those cases, in that one intestate
heir who successfully challenges a will does not suffer at the expense of the others that he has
benefitted Butit does not follow afortori that the services of counsel that attempted un^ucce^s/ii/fy
to prevent distribution under a valid will, as are the circumstances in the case at bar, are of similar
benefit Indeed, the court in Estate ofKaschor, supra, denied the award of attorneys fees to even
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successful will contestants, noting that "benefit" under the Oklahoma cases means an increase in the
assets of the estate. Estate ofKaschor, 637 P.2d at 857.
Harold did nothing in this case to increase the assets of the estate. Nor did Harold's actions
benefit any other heirs. If anything, Harold's actions harmed Jeff, the sole heir to the estate. And
Harold did everything he could to defeat Jamie's Will - a document which this Court has found to
be a valid testamentary instrument In reality, what Harold sought to do was to effectuate a change
in who would receive the assets of the estate. While preventing an estate from being distributed
unlawfully may provide a benefit to the estate, Estate ofFoster, 699 P.2d at 646, Harold fought to
prevent Jamie's estate from being distributed in the lawful manner in which Jamie intended. As
explained above, Harold's position that attorneys fees should be paid out of the estate to unsuccessful
will challengers would encourage those who stand to benefitfromthe rejection of a will to raise even
the most attenuated challenges to its probate. Harold's reargument of this issue should be rejected.

D. HAROLD HAS OFFERED NO FACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE COURT'S EXERCISE OF
ITS EQUITABLE POWERS TO AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES.
-Without authority, Harold asserts that a fundamental tenant of probate law is that the estate
should bear the necessary costs of its own administration. Harold goes on to assert that unless he
is awarded his own attorneys fees, the estate itself will be relieved of any responsibility for its own
probate costs and that that would be inequitable, (Harold's Motion to Reconsider, p. 5). Harold is
flatly wrong.
Attorneys fees may be awarded under the Probate Code under the very specific circumstances
outlined in §75-3-719- This court has already convindngly ruled that Harold does not qualify under
6
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that statute for an award of fees. While Estate of Foster, 699 P.2d at 645, recognizes that the New
Mexico probate statutes are supplemented by court's inherent equitable powers to award fees, Foster
also notes that the award of fees under the court's equitable powers "depends on the facts of the case
and the exercise of equitable power must be used with discretion. An award of attorneys fees is not
automatic even if there is no dispute about the benefit [provided to the estate]." Estate ofFoster, 699
P.2dat646.
In his invocation of the Court's equitable powers in this case, Harold has offered nothing
other than his assertion that it was Jamie's fault that the Will was lost, and that since estates should
bear the necessary costs of their own administration, it would be unfair for Harold to have to pay his
own attorneys fees.2 But in every will contest there is an element of fault in the testator's failure to
effectuate his intent in a manner in which there could be no challenge to the will. Under Harold's
argument, an award of attorneys fees to unsuccessful will challengers would be automatic, for in
every will contest, the testator (and thus the estate) would have been responsible for causing the
proceeding. Even if this Court were willing to exercise its equitable powers under a Foster-type
analysis, there are no fects in this case sufficient to justify overriding the Probate Code's otherwise
clear instructions about who is entitled to attorneys fees in a will contest3

2

Harold also asserts that unless he is awarded his fees, the estate itself will be relieved of
any responsibility for its own probate costs. (Harold's Motion to Reconsider, p. 5). Harold
forgets Jeffs own (substantial) expenditures in advancing Jamie's Will, which will ultimately be
paid directly or indirectlyfromthe estate. Under the circumstances of this case, since Jeff is the
estate's sole heir, what Harold is really asking is that Jeffpay Harold's attorney's fees.
3

As Jeff noted in his opposition to Harold's original motion, Harold failed to raise the
attorneys fees issue in his pre-trial pleadings or at trial. Had he done so, the facts that would be
(continued...)
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CONCLUSION
Harold has failed to satisfy Rule 54(b)'s requirements for reconsideration of his original
motion. As a result, and for the reasons set forth above, Harold's Motion to Reconsider Denial of
Attorneys Fees should be denied.
DATED t W s ^ O ^ a y of October, 1998.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

Leslie Van Frank
Attorneys for Jeffrey Paul Hupe

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
was hand-delivered on this

of October, 1998, to the following:
Kent B. Alderman, Esq.
Elizabeth S. Conley, Esq.

PARSONS, BEHLE, & LATIMER, P.C.
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Attorneys for Harold Francis Hupe
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(...continued)
necessary to defend against (or, indeed, to justify) the exercise of the Court's equitable powers
could have been explored. Having failed to raise the attorneys fee issue until after the trial was
completed, Harold has waived it
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